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ABSTRACT 
We examine whether a disclosure mandate for greenhouse gas emissions creates 
stakeholder pressure for firms to subsequently reduce their emissions. For UK-
incorporated listed firms such a mandate was adopted in 2013. Using a difference- in-
differences design, we find that firms affected by the mandate reduced their emissions – 
depending on the specification – by an incremental 14-18% relative to a control group. 
This reduction was accompanied by an average 9% increase in production costs. At the 
same time, the treated firms were able to increase their sales by an almost compensating 
amount. Taken together, our findings provide no indication that the disclosure 
requirement led to a significant deterioration in the financial operating performance of 
the treated firms, despite the significant carbon footprint reduction following the 
disclosure mandate. 
Keywords: Disclosure of non-financial information; mandatory disclosure; greenhouse 
gas emissions; real effects 
JEL Classification: Q28, Q40, M41, M48 
Data Availability: Publicly available from the sources cited in the text 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is widely regarded as one of the most vexing societal challenges of our time. 
The root cause of this challenge arguably is the fundamental externality that arises when 
economic subjects do not internalize the full social cost of their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. 
The continuing mismatch between the private and social costs of CO2 emissions has arguably 
resulted in an unabated global market failure.1 Policymakers have begun to counteract this 
mismatch either by imposing a price on carbon emissions or through direct regulations of 
emissions.2 At the same time, relatively little is known about the effectiveness of a mere 
disclosure mandate that requires firms to report their carbon footprint without any further 
obligation to subsequently reduce these emissions.3 
A central axiom in management accounting, dating back to Drucker (1954), states: “what 
gets measured, also gets managed”. Inside firms, this linkage is plausible and well-documented 
to the extent that the variable of interest is included in the firm’s performance evaluation and 
incentive system.4 The linkage between measurement and subsequent improvements becomes 
more tenuous in a market setting where firms disclose the variable of interest to the general 
public. It appears plausible that a mere requirement to report carbon emissions will 
“incentivize” firms to improve upon their subsequent emissions, even though such 
improvements are costly, because firms also anticipate being “rewarded” by external 
stakeholders for these improvements.  
Numerous studies on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities and the attendant 
Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) scores have observed that improvements in 
outcome variables are often difficult to establish because there is no commonly accepted 
measurement framework, e.g., labor practices.5 The lack of a well-defined measurement 
framework also makes it difficult, if not practically impossible, to have subsequent outcomes 
verified by third parties.6 In these respects, greenhouse gas emissions are relative exceptions as 
they involve straightforward physical measurements, the delineation of scope (e.g., so-called 
                                                 
1 The so-called Stern Review (Stern, 2006) famously refers to climate change as “the greatest market failure ever 
seen”. 
2 See Ellerman et al. (2010), Anderson and Di Maria (2011), Bel and Joseph (2015), Murray and Maniloff (2015), 
and Martin, Muûls, and Wagner (2016). 
3 As discussed in more detail below, contemporaneous papers by Tomar (2019), Jouvenot and Krueger (2020) and 
Grewal (2019) also examine the real effects of carbon disclosures mandates. 
4 See, for instance, Young and O’Byrne (2001), Kaplan and Anderson (2007). 
5 See, for instance, Christensen et al. (2017), Fiechter et al. (2019), and Grewal et al. (2019) for a comprehensive 
assessment of the many recent studies on corporate sustainability management. 
6 Kanodia (2007) develops a model framework in which the designer faces a tradeoff in terms of setting a precision 
standard for disclosures due to the real (investment) effects that emerge in the ensuing market equilibrium. 
2 
 
Scope 1 emissions) and an aggregate score for multiple greenhouse gases in order to arrive at a 
measure of CO2 equivalents. 
Our main hypothesis is that mandatory reporting of carbon footprints creates “stakeholder 
pressure” for firms to subsequently “manage” – in the spirit of Drucker (1954) – their carbon 
emissions. Firms arguably will do so because multiple stakeholder groups, including customers, 
employees and investors, regard corporate emissions as a negative firm attribute. In that sense, 
a disclosure mandate may create a “pillory” with regard to a firm’s carbon footprint. As firms 
can report improvements with regard to this publicly reported “bad” in the future, they will 
arguably improve their standing with different stakeholder groups.7 We examine this interact ion 
both in terms of subsequent corporate CO2 emission levels as well as subsequent financ ia l 
operating performance.8 
The empirical approach in this paper derives from the 2013 Regulations of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report). This regulation imposed a 
mandate on publicly listed UK-incorporated firms to report their GHG emissions in their annual 
reports. Prior to this mandate, companies had an obligation to gather and report the emissio ns 
of their individual installations (i.e., production sites such as power plants or steel mills) 
regulated under the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to a publicly 
available register.9 Prior to 2013, there was no obligation for publicly listed UK firms to report 
their overall “carbon footprint” by aggregating their installation-level emissions as part of the 
annual corporate report. In that sense, the regulation arguably increased transparency as 
interested parties no longer need to trace emission figures at the installation level back to the 
parent companies owning the installation.   
To examine the impact of the UK GHG emission disclosure mandate on subsequent 
emissions and financial performance, we adopt a difference-in-differences approach (DiD) 
surrounding the implementation of the 2013 Regulation under the Companies Act. We compare 
the difference between pre- and post-mandate emission data for affected firms with emissio n 
data for a sample of control firms. In our study, this comparison is made feasible by tracing the 
emissions of all installations, as reported to the central EU registry, back to the firms in our 
sample for a nine-year time window centered around the year 2013. The treatment group in our 
                                                 
7 A particular firm attribute, like pollution, that is publicly known and viewed as a negative by investors is also the 
central feature in the models of Heinkel et al. (2001) and Friedman and Heinle (2016). 
8 Prior studies document real effects of disclosure regulation on investment (Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Zhang 2013;  
Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009; Biddle and Hilary 2006; Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin 2011; Shroff, Verdi, and 
Yu 2014; Shroff 2017), mine safety (Christensen, Floyd, Liu, and Maffett 2017), and managerial short-termis m 
(Ernstberger, Link, Stich, and Vogler 2017; Kraft, Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam 2018; Granja 2018). 
9 The EU Transaction Log registers yearly emissions from all installations regulated under the EU Emissions 
Trading System. 
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DiD design consists of all installations, located in the UK or another European country, but 
ultimately owned by UK-incorporated and publicly listed companies.10 The control group 
consists of installations ultimately owned by companies not subject to the 2013 Act, i.e., UK-
incorporated firms that are not publicly listed as well as publicly listed firms in other EU 
countries. 
Our results provide evidence of a significant reduction in GHG emissions following the 
disclosure mandate for firms in the treatment group relative to the control group. The effect is 
sizable insofar as firms subject to the mandate on average reduce their GHG emissions by an 
additional 14-18% between the pre- and the post-mandate period. The estimate varies somewhat 
depending on whether the outcome variable is specified as (the logarithm of) emissions at the 
individual installation level or the aggregate firm level. To ensure that emission reductions are 
not partly attributed to reductions in capacity utilization, we also examine the effects of the 
mandate on carbon intensity, defined as the ratio of CO2 emissions to cost of goods sold 
(COGS). Our results here again yield a significant incremental effect in the range of an 
additional 8-9% reduction in carbon intensity for firms that were subject to the 2013 disclosure 
mandate. 
In additional tests, we find that the emission reductions occur over several years. 
Furthermore, our analysis identifies an incremental reduction impact for those treated firms that 
had relatively high levels of CO2 emissions prior to the mandate. A similar incremental effect 
is established for firms that are subject to more intense analyst coverage, an effect we attribute 
to the notion that greater analyst coverage results in greater visibility and thereby creates 
additional pressure for firms to reduce their emissions. Finally, we provide evidence that the 
aforementioned findings are robust to various sample specifications, i.e., alternative control 
groups, and propensity score matching.   
Having established that the disclosure requirement had a real effect in terms of carbon 
emissions, the immediate next question concerns the impact of the requirement on the firms’ 
financial operating performance. One would expect that abnormal efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions are accompanied by a corresponding increase in production costs. Firms can 
potentially reduce emissions through a range of measures, including the outsourcing of carbon 
intensive activities, input substitution, e.g., the use of a less carbon-intensive energy carrier for 
                                                 
10 Our study focuses on data of all installations covered by the EU ETS, i.e. emissions within the 27 member states 
of the European Union and Norway. Data on installations in other countries is not available. Thus, we cannot rule 
out that substitutions between European and non-European installations influence our results. However, because 
the Companies Act requires disclosure of all corporate emissions unrelated of the respective country, we expect 
our results not to be severely biased. In this context, Dechezleprêtre, Genaioli, Martin, and Muûls (2014) find no 
carbon substitution effects across countries. 
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heating furnaces, or through capital investments that reduce the need for burning fossil fuels, 
e.g., energy efficiency measures. Any of these activities would lead to an increase in the firm’s 
cost of goods sold. Our findings indicate that the treated firms did experience a significant 
differential increase of about 9% in their production costs (as measured by COGS), relative to 
the control group. 
On the sales side, we find that the treated firms also achieved a 7% differential increase in 
their sales. This increase may, of course, simply reflect pricing power that allowed these firms 
to pass on the increase in their production costs. At the same time, and in line with our 
“stakeholder pressure” argument, the differential increase in sales for the treated firms could 
also reflect greater customer loyalty. By being able to credibly convey progress on a goal that 
is widely regarded as a central corporate social responsibility, the firms arguably improved their 
public image and their standing with customers.   
For the treatment group in our sample, the incremental increases in both sales and cost of 
goods sold almost cancel each other. The corresponding net effect on the observed gross 
margins is small and furthermore this variable does not emerge as significant in our difference-
in-differences analysis. Taken together, our findings provide no indication that the disclosure 
requirement for publicly listed UK listed firms led to a significant deterioration in their financ ia l 
operating performance. 
The magnitude of the reduction in emissions and the accompanying significant different ia l 
increase in both production costs and sales may appear surprising for two related reasons. First, 
as mentioned above, raw information about Scope 1 emissions at the level of individua l 
installations was already available prior to the 2013 mandate. As such, the mandate arguably 
only “pilloried” the treated firms to the extent that firm-level emissions became more accessible 
and transparent. Second, more than two-thirds of the treated firms in our sample participated in 
the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) which provides a global forum for firms, and/or their 
subsidiaries, to supply voluntary information about their GHG emissions and ongoing efforts 
to reduce those emissions.11 There are no precise standards or requirements for the information 
firms furnish to the CDP. A reflection of this lack of formal requirements is that the CDP rates 
the participating firms with a score regarding the credibility and comprehensiveness of their 
voluntary disclosures. One way to interpret the UK GHG reporting mandate is that the 
obligation to report total corporate Scope 1 and 2 CO2 emissions annually forced the 
                                                 
11 Broadstock, Collins, Hunt and Vegos (2018) point to the endogeneity issues that have afflicted empirical studies 
on voluntary corporate disclosures of GHG emissions. 
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“unraveling” of the voluntary and partial disclosure “equilibrium” that was in effect prior to 
2013. 
Several other contemporaneous studies have recently examined the effects of legal mandates 
to report GHG emissions. Closest to our study are the papers by Jouvenot and Krueger (2020), 
Grewal (2020) and Tomar (2019), with the first two of these also focusing on the UK disclosure 
mandate for GHG emissions beginning in 2013. To quantify the impact of the mandate on 
subsequent emission levels, Jouvenot and Krueger (2020) rely on voluntarily disclosed 
information in the CDP database and on emission estimates issued by non-governmenta l 
organizations that track corporate GHG emissions. In contrast, our analysis relies on the 
granular, time-consistent and verified data provided to the European Union Transaction Log 
(EUTL) register at the level of individual production sites, both prior to and after the mandate. 
Beyond the impact of the mandate on actual emissions, our study examines the impact on 
financial operating performance, while Jouvenot and Krueger (2020) study the consequences 
of the mandate on investments by large institutional investors and on media coverage. 
In another independent study, Grewal (2019) considers a population of firms that were 
voluntarily reporting information about their GHG emissions and establishes an incrementa l 
reduction effect for those in the population that also became subject to the 2013 UK mandate. 
Grewal’s findings are consistent with our view expressed above that the reporting mandate had 
an additional “pillory effect” beyond the information that firms already disclosed through 
channels like the Carbon Disclosure Project. 
Tomar (2019) studies the effect of a regulation that obligates large US production facilit ies 
to report their emissions to the US Environmental Protection Agency. In contrast to the UK 
regulation, however, there is no requirement for US firms to disclose their emissions in the 
aggregate as part of the annual report. In that sense the post-mandate disclosure requirement in 
Tomar’s study is similar to the pre-mandate setting UK firm faced on account of the EU ETS 
regulations prior to the 2013 Act. Tomar (2019) develops an estimation technique for assessing 
emission levels in the pre-treatment period for both the treatment and the control group. At the 
same time, Tomar’s main findings, like the other two studies discussed above, are broadly 
consistent with our first result that the disclosure mandate resulted in a significant subsequent 
GHG emission reduction. 
Beyond the issue of GHG emissions, our study adds to the broader literature on real effects 
of mandatory disclosure of environmental and social firm performance. In a recent study, Chen 
et al. (2018) show that mandatory CSR reporting decreases local pollution levels, i.e., 
wastewater and sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions in Chinese cities in which firms affected by the 
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CSR mandate are located. Chen et al. also argue that the CSR mandate was associated with a 
decrease in firms’ accounting rates of return. Christensen et al. (2018) provide evidence that 
disclosure required by the Dodd-Frank Act on mine safety in financial reports improves worker 
safety in the respective mines. 
While these papers study the impact of disclosure on a local and direct hazard in terms of 
city-level wastewater and SO2 emissions and mine injuries, we focus on the impact of disclosure 
on GHG emissions which are considered a long-term hazard to global climate stability. In case 
of local hazards, it appears immediately plausible that local stakeholders can exert pressure on 
companies to take remedial actions. In contrast, with global pollution, the intensity of 
stakeholder pressure is less clear because the costs from GHG pollution and therefore the 
benefits of reducing it, are distributed globally and often do not tangibly affect local 
stakeholders.12  
Chen et al. (2018) examine a comparatively broad disclosure regulation regarding CSR 
reports and measure the effect indirectly by a reduction in SO2 emissions in cities, where at 
least one factory of a company is located, i.e., emissions are measured at the (city-leve l) 
destination. However, destination-based pollution data can differ from pollution at the firm-
level for instance due to a shifting of pollution activities across regions or as a result of weather 
conditions and unobserved local emissions. In contrast, we rely on emissions data at the source, 
i.e., emissions of installations (located in multiple countries), and trace these emissions back to 
firm. Finally, the results of Chen et al. (2018) reflect two distinct effects: a new disclosure 
requirement and the measurement and collection of pertinent data. Similar to the setting in 
Christensen et al. (2017), we are in a position to isolate the effect of the disclosure mandate 
which effectively becomes an additional communication channel for information on GHG 
emissions that was collected in the same manner before and after the mandate. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the regulatory 
background and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the research design. 
Results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents sensitivity and additiona l 
analyses. We conclude in Section 6. 
                                                 
12 Prior literature has established that SO2 is a local hazard affecting human health outcomes and agricultural yields 
(EPA 2019; Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nordhaus 2011), while CO2 constitutes a non-toxic, yet global long-term 
threat to the stability of the world’s climate. In that sense, SO2 effects are significantly different from those of 
GHG emissions like CO2. In addition, abatement of GHG emissions must materialize through costly changes to 
production processes or reductions in production volume, while abatement of SO2 emissions is relatively 
straightforward with the installation of filters.  
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2. REGULATORY BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Regulatory Background 
The 2013 Regulations of the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 
were presented to the UK Parliament by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) on June 11, 2013. The regulations were published in August of 2013 and came into effect 
on October 1, 2013.13 Accordingly, “listed companies” are required to disclose their direct and 
indirect GHG emissions in their annual reports. Section 385 (2) of the Act defines a listed 
company as a UK-incorporated company whose equity share capital is either listed on the Main 
Market of the London Stock Exchange, an exchange in a European Economic Area state, the 
New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq. The Act applies to all fiscal years ending on or after the 
30th of September 2013. 
Under the Act, affected companies must report in the directors’ report their direct (Scope 1) 
and indirect (Scope 2) GHG emissions during the last 12 months.14 Direct emissions are those 
caused by the combustion of fuels and the operation of production facilities. Indirect emissions 
are those resulting from the purchase of electricity, heat, steam or cooling. The following 
greenhouse gases have to be included in the report: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6). Companies are not required to provide individual emission figures for each 
of the greenhouse gases listed. Instead they must report the aggregate annual quantity of GHG 
emissions in tCO2eq, with the weights determined according to the weights set by the IPCC.15  
To study the effect of the 2013 carbon disclosure mandate on the emissions of the affected 
firms in Britain, we examine data collected through the Emission Trading (ETS) scheme of the 
European Union (EU). The data gathered under the auspices of the EU ETS is publicly availab le 
in the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) register, which provides installation-leve l 
information including an installation’s name, its operator and the sector it is assigned to in the 
EU ETS (e.g., production of bulk chemicals or combustion of fuels). The EUTL also provides 
                                                 
13 Leuz and Wysocki (2016) argue that new regulations are often a response to major events like scandals or crises 
and that financial markets react to the major events triggering a change in firm behavior. In our setting, the mandate 
for disclosing GHG emissions was not a reaction to a major event but was part of a broader amendment aimed at 
simplifying and restructuring companies’ narrative reports. In addition, a search of all major events in 2012 and 
2013 on the Wikipedia sites “2012 and 2013 in the United Kingdom” for “climate” or “scandal” yields no climate 
change related events or relevant company scandals (the only scandal was the manipulation of LIBOR rates). 
14 Companies may also report emissions for a period different from their financial year. For our study, we use data 
provided by the EU ETS, measured on a calendar year base. 
15 The UK Government publishes the conversion factors for GHG emissions to tCO2 equivalents on an annual 
base. These factors are consistent with international carbon reporting practice and follow IPPC standards. The 
report must be approved by the Board of Directors and reviewed by the statutory auditor, while compliance with  
the act is enforced by the UK Financial Reporting Council. Directors of the affected firms face fines for being 
reckless or failing to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance (paragraph 415, (4) and (5) of the Act). 
8 
 
information on the volume of verified emissions, as reported by an independent third party (e.g., 
accounting and engineering companies) that is accredited by the relevant administrative bodies 
(European Parliament 2003). 
Since its introduction in 2005, the EU ETS has become the world’s largest multi-nationa l 
emission trading system.16 This cap-and-trade mechanism covers industries that account for 
about 45% of the European Union’s GHG emissions (Ellerman, Marcantonini, and Zaklan 
2016).17 The remaining emissions that are not covered primarily come from the transportation, 
residential, and agricultural sectors (DECC 2016). Installations are covered by the EU ETS if 
they include a facility with a rated thermal input of at least 20 MW – enough to supply about 
15,000 households with electricity at a given point in time – or if they fall into one or several 
of the following manufacturing segments: oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel, cement 
clinker, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board, aluminum, petrochemica ls, 
ammonia, nitric, adipic, and glyoxylic acid production (European Commission 2015). Due to 
these rules, EU ETS coverage is concentrated in the sectors of energy supply and industr ia l 
manufacturing, covering approximately 79% of all UK emissions in 2014.  
Annual emissions by installations vary widely, ranging from a few thousand tons per year at 
small installations to several million tons at large coal power plants. The average (mean) UK 
installation covered by the EU ETS had emissions of about 100,000 tons of CO2 equivalents 
during our sample period.18  
From an inference perspective, there are several benefits to our approach of tracking direct 
(Scope 1) CO2 emissions from individual installations according to the EU ETS data. Most 
importantly, the reported figures were measured and selectively verified in a time consistent 
manner both before and after the UK disclosure mandate went into effect. Unlike other studies, 
for instance, Tomar (2019), we therefore do not face the task of having to estimate a firm’s 
emissions prior to the reporting mandate. 
To examine the impact of the disclosure mandate on subsequent emissions, we aggregate the 
emissions data at the installation level and assign them to the firm owning the installations. As 
                                                 
16 Emission trading systems similar to the EU ETS have also been introduced in a few other jurisdictions. In the 
US, the California cap-and-trade scheme covers GHG emissions from power generation and industrial activities 
of facilities based in California (Air Resources Board 2016) and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative covers 
emissions from electricity production in nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states (RGGI 2013). 
17 For our sample country, the UK, the EU ETS covers a similar share of total emissions. For instance, in 2014, 
the first full year after the introduction of the disclosure rule the EU ETS covered about 41% of total UK emissions. 
In 2014, total UK emissions were 514 million tons of CO2eq, while the sum of verified emissions of all UK 
installations in the UK was 208 million tons of CO2eq (DECC 2016).  
18 For our study, we focus on installations with data over the complete sample period. As a consequence, our 
sample is skewed towards larger installations. 
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illustrated in Figure 1, the mapping from installations to firms (mathematically, a function) is 
carried out for both the treated UK-headquartered firms and the control group of other firms, 
not subject to the mandate.  
 
---Insert Figure 1 here--- 
 
We emphasize that in the context of our study the disclosure mandate did not entail 
additional public information, because the emissions of the treated firms were already publicly 
accessible, albeit in a rather fragmented form, through the European Union transaction log 
(EUTL) register. In essence, the informational effect of the disclosure mandate was to increase 
transparency in so far as the interested public no longer had to implement the mapping shown 
in Figure 1 in order to calculate a firm’s overall Scope 1 emissions. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
The hypotheses tested in this paper pertain both to changes in CO2 eq. emissions and to 
changes in the financial operating performance of the firms subject to the UK disclosure 
mandate. Broadly, our approach is consistent with the so-called targeted disclosure cycle theory 
(Fung, Weil, and Graham 2007). Accordingly, disclosures influence the behavior of receivers 
(stakeholders) leading to real effects in the variables to be disclosed in the future. The 
information providers anticipate these behavioral changes and take actions that enable more 
favorable disclosures. 
In a recent survey article, Hombach and Sellhorn (2019) lay out a set of criteria in order for 
corporate reporting mandates to have real effects. Aside from sufficiently precise reporting 
standards for which compliance is enforceable, the reporting variables in question must 
generate additional public information, or at least reduce information gathering costs to the 
public. Hombach and Sellhorn (2019) also posit that the disclosed information must be broadly 
value relevant, possibly by illuminating potential future risks to the business, in order for real 
effects to emerge from a reporting mandate. Finally, management must have both the discretion 
and the motivation to subsequently improve outcomes with regard to the disclosure variable in 
question. 
The above criteria all appear to be met in the context of the UK 2013 carbon reporting 
mandate, beginning with a precise reporting standard and the prospect of enforcement.19 In 
                                                 
19 In case of non-compliance, the UK Financial Reporting Council is in charge of bringing claims to court. 
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addition, it is plausible that for many firms their stakeholders, including customers, employees 
and capital providers, view the firm’s carbon footprint as a negative. Because of the externality 
that the firm’s emissions have on world’s climate, these constituents would intrinsically prefer 
a lower carbon footprint, yet they understand that certain emissions levels are unavoidable if 
the firm is to manufacture its products in a cost competitive manner.  
In order to reduce their carbon footprint, firms will almost certainly incur higher production 
costs (otherwise they would have had every reason to take the appropriate action prior to the 
2013 regulation). The magnitude and shape of the individual abatement cost curves, however, 
appears difficult to gauge. Among the emission reducing measures that would be available to 
most publicly listed firms in the short and medium run is the procurement of more electric ity 
from renewable sources (and thereby reduce Scope 2 emissions). For manufacturing firms, 
additional reduction measures include a possible change in the output mix as well as input 
substitutions that phase-out the use of carbon-intensive materials, like coal.20 Finally, holding 
output and production processes constant, many businesses will be in a position to reduce their 
fossil-fuel consumption through additional maintenance expenditures and investments in 
energy efficient equipment. 
If the treatment group in our sample indeed viewed the 2013 carbon disclosure mandate as 
a “pillory” that created stakeholder pressure for subsequent improvements in GHG emissions, 
the immediate question becomes what cost-benefit tradeoffs a firm faces in reducing its carbon 
footprint. On the benefit side, firms may anticipate that corresponding production cost increases 
can at least be partially passed on to consumers. While the possibility of pass-through generally 
depends on a firm’s cost structure and pricing power, a tangible reduction in publicly reported 
carbon emissions will arguably improve the firm’s public image. That, in turn, may lead to 
greater customer loyalty, and thereby a lower price elasticity of demand for customers who 
regard the firm’s carbon footprint as a negative attribute.21 In that context, the decision to reduce 
emissions in the interest of “stakeholder capitalism” may be partially aligned with the interests 
of shareholders.  
Another stakeholder group that may react favorably to improvements in reported carbon 
emissions are the firm’s own employees. For the same reasons as articulated in connection with 
customers, some employees will be intrinsically concerned about the climate damaging effects 
                                                 
20 In production processes requiring high operating temperatures, for instance, some industries can switch from 
using coal or oil as a heating agent and instead rely either on electricity or less-carbon intensive agents like natural 
gas or hydrogen. 
21 Hoyt and Reichelstein (2011a and 2011b) argue that this linkage was important for the management of the 
equipment retailer REI in setting sustainability targets, including a substantial carbon footprint reduction. 
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of the firm’s emissions. This group will tend to identify more strongly with an organization that 
can publicly and credibly claim to be innovative and progressive on the issue of climate change. 
To the innovating firms, the potential benefit from such an improvement in public perception 
is that ceteris paribus less compensation may be required to retain valued employees. 
Finally, management of the firms in our treatment group may anticipate penalties by the 
capital markets unless improvements in carbon emissions can be claimed in time periods 
following a precise disclosure mandate. In recent years, institutional equity investors have 
become increasingly vocal that meaningful sustainability practices are becoming a major 
criterion for the inclusion of firms in their portfolios.22 A potential penalty for firms that are 
viewed as stagnant in their emission levels, or other corporate sustainability activities, is that 
they may be “shunned” by some investor groups, effectively leading to an increase in their cost 
of equity capital.23 The models of Kraus et al. (2010) and Friedman and Heinle (2016) 
characterize formal equilibria where equity investors can effectively exert pressure on the firm 
to improve its sustainability practices.24 The preference structure of these institutional investors 
may directly reflect the intrinsic preferences of their capital providers. Some institutiona l 
investors have also been explicit that they view sustainability practices as an effective 
mitigation strategy with regard to future financial risks, specifically the risk of carbon intens ive 
assets becoming economically impaired.25  
There are also arguments to suggest that the real effect of the UK mandate could be minor. 
These arguments include the possibility that the added transparency resulting from the 
disclosure requirement was inconsequential in so far as concerned parties could already access 
the EU transaction log prior to the mandate and, with some additional information gathering 
effort, trace the emissions from individual installations back to the parent companies owning 
the installations (Figure 1).  
In addition, a substantial share of the treatment firms in our sample did already report 
information related to their GHG emissions to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) prior to 
2013. We note, however, that these disclosures are neither subject to binding standards, nor are 
                                                 
22 In a global survey of institutional investors, Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim (2018) document that ethical 
considerations play an increasingly important role for investment decisions besides financial aspects. 
23 A recent illustration of such “penalties” was provided in the annual letter to shareholders by the CEO of 
BlackRock, L.Fink, when he threatened: “we will be increasingly disposed to vote against management and 
board directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on sustainability-related disclosures and the 
business practices and plans underlying them” (Timmer, 2020).   
24 Disclosure is not an issue in these models as the CSR variable of interest is assumed to be publicly available 
information. 
25 The linkage between environmental sustainability and long-term financial sustainability is emphasized, for 
instance, by investment funds like Generation Investment Capital (Bebb and Reichelstein, 2016). 
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they generally verified by a third party.26 Participation in the CDP has always been voluntary 
and therefore reflects self-selection by the participating firms.27 Nonetheless, these disclosures 
may already have conveyed material firm-level information about emissions ahead of the 2013 
regulation.28 Finally, while the treated firms may indeed feel a “pillory effect” for their 
emissions, the actual reduction potential available to them in the short and medium run, i.e., 
over a period of four years in our observation window, may have been limited. This may be 
especially plausible because many of the treated firms were already subject to carbon pricing 
under the EU ETS system and therefore already had an incentive to adjust their production 
processes in the direction of more energy- and carbon-efficiency.  
Mindful of the preceding countervailing considerations, we nonetheless state the following 
hypothesis. 
 
H1: Firms subject to the UK mandate for annual disclosure of GHG emissions attain a larger 
reduction in their Scope 1 emissions than firms not subject to the mandate. 
 
We recall that our overall hypothesis is that a carbon disclosure mandate will pressure firms to 
reduce their emissions because doing so improves the firm’s standing with key stakeholder 
groups. This line of reasoning also makes it plausible that, among the treated firms, those who 
had relatively high emissions prior to the mandate will feel additional pressure, and thus reduce 
their emissions by a larger percentage in the post-mandate time period. We test a second variant 
of H1 for treated firms which in the pre-treatment period received relatively intense analyst 
coverage, as measured by the number of analysts following the firm. Our reasoning here is that 
the transparency effect of the mandatory disclosure in annual reports will be magnified for those 
firms receiving more intense coverage by analysts.  
Our next two hypotheses pertain to the operating performance of the treated firms. 
Specifically, we examine changes in their reported cost of goods sold and their sales. If firms 
                                                 
26 A survey of UK equity fund managers shows that the lack of detailed requirements concerning reporting 
methodologies and organizational boundaries as well as the lack of a third-party audit or review was an important  
barrier for their reliance on voluntary GHG emission data (Trucost 2009). 
27 Examining voluntary carbon disclosure in the UK retail sector, Sullivan and Gouldson (2012) indicate that 
voluntary disclosure limits investors’ ability to assess corporate climate performance due to different scopes of 
reporting and inconsistencies in the information being reported. In addition, DEFRA (2010) states that “even 
though CDP data is widely regarded as the most complete and comprehensive dataset on climate disclosure, many 
question quality of data as an issue which is inevitable with any voluntary disclosure scheme not requiring third 
party verification”. 
28 According to a survey of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in partnership with the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP), voluntary reporting of GHG emissions by a company raised the awareness of emissions for the board of 
directors, employees and the general public (PwC and CDP 2010). 
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subject to the mandate did indeed reduce their emissions differentially more than the control 
group, as postulated in H1, the treated firms should also experience a corresponding increase in 
their production costs in the subsequent post-mandate period. In order to reduce emissions, the 
treated firms presumably had to make a costly switch in production inputs. In addition, they 
may have invested new fixed assets that enabled a smaller carbon footprint. The corresponding 
depreciation charges would then increase Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) in subsequent years. 
This consideration motivates the following second hypothesis. 29 
 
H2a: Firms subject to the UK mandate for annual disclosure of GHG emissions exhibit an 
increase in their reported COGS in comparison to firms not subject to the mandate. 
 
Standard microeconomic theory suggests that the impact of an increase in production costs on 
revenue will depend on several factors including the price elasticity of demand and whether the 
cost increase pertains to the fixed or variable costs of production. Importantly, in the context of 
the disclosure mandate examined here, the increase in production costs is endogenous to the 
extent that firms take deliberate actions in order to lower their carbon footprint. In so doing, 
they will generally anticipate a partial offset of the higher production costs through a 
corresponding increase in sales. In addition to the usual possibilities of a cost pass-through, 
firms may anticipate a “reward effect” in the form of greater customer loyalty, and a 
corresponding lower price elasticity of demand, for those firms that can demonstrate 
improvements in their carbon footprint in the post mandate period. 
   
H2b: Firms subject to the UK mandate for annual disclosure of GHG emissions exhibit an 
increase in their sales in comparison to firms not subject to the mandate. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
3.1.Empirical Test: Hypothesis H1 
To estimate the effect of the GHG emission disclosure mandate on actual emissions following 
the UK Companies Act, we use the following staggered difference- in-differences approach: 
 
                                                 
29 It is, of course, possible that firms took costly actions to reduce emissions yet do not experience any offset in 
sales, simply because they anticipated an even steeper sales decline absent any reduction in emissions. 
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E = α0 + α1 · Post + α2 · Post · Treat + ∑ Control variables 
       + Fixed effects for installation, year, industry-year, and country-year + ε,                     (1) 
 
where all variables are defined in Table 1. We estimate multiple variants of the regression 
equation in (1) which specify the dependent variable “emissions” E as either i) the natural 
logarithm of CO2 equivalent emissions at the level of individual installations, or ii) the natural 
logarithm of CO2 equivalent emissions at the aggregate level of the firm owning the installa t ion 
(as illustrated in Figure 1), or iii) the natural logarithm of carbon intensity, defined as the ratio 
of CO2 emissions to COGS at the firm level.30 By construction, the carbon intensity variable 
should reveal if a reduction in emissions should be be attributed to a mere reduction in 
production volume. 
Post is a binary variable indicating periods after the mandate for GHG emission disclosure. 
Our study is based on observations from the years 2008 to 2016. The mandate for GHG 
emission disclosure applies to all fiscal years ending on or after September 30th, 2013. If a firm’s 
fiscal year ends before the 30th of September 2013, we define the installation- level emission 
data observed for the calendar year 2013 to be a pre-treatment observation. If a firm’s financ ia l 
year ends on or after the 30th of September 2013, we define the installation- level emission data 
observed for the calendar year 2013 to be a post-treatment observation. Consequently, the 
mandate to disclose GHG emissions applies to firms as of 2013 or 2014 (staggered 
implementation), depending on the respective fiscal year-end date.  
Treat is another indicator variable which assumes the value 1 only if a particular firm was 
subject to the mandate. For our tests at the level of individual installations, Treat assumes the 
value 1 if and only if the installation belongs to a firm that was obligated to report its emissions 
following the 2103 Act. As the control group, we use installations ultimately held by firms not 
subject to the mandate for GHG emission disclosure. Thus, the control group consists of non-
listed British firms as well as firms listed in other EU15 countries.  
Our primary variable of interest is α2 · Post · Treat, with a negative coefficient α2 indicat ing 
that in the aggregate the treated firms achieved an incremental reduction in emissions following 
the disclosure mandate. In order to detect an additional incremental effect attributable to firms 
that either had large emissions prior to the mandate, or had relatively intense analyst coverage, 
we introduce additional triple indicator variables in testing the variants of H1. 
                                                 
30 We discuss the common trend of GHG emissions for treated and non-treated firms in our results section. 
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To control for differences in characteristics of firms that ultimately own installations, we 
include firm-level variables to account for differences in firm size, profitability, and leverage. 
To control for time-variant and time-invariant installation heterogeneity, we include 
installation, year, industry-year, and country-year fixed effects for all tests. Installation fixed 
effects control for any time-invariant installation-specific unobserved heterogeneity such as 
installation-specific abatement cost.31 Year fixed effects capture annual effects that pertain to 
all installations, for instance, changes in gasoline prices.32 Industry-year fixed effects capture 
the annual effects of all installations within the same industry. We define installation industr ies 
based on the NACE Rev.2 sector classification. Country-year fixed effects capture the annual 
effects of all installations within the same country. Since not all installations of a firm are 
located in the same country as the parent company itself,33 divergent national regulations may 
also have an influence on emission reductions.34 
To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.35 We draw our inferences based on standard errors clustered by firm reflecting that 
all installations of a UK listed and incorporated firm subject to the mandate, independent of the 
actual geographic location or industry classification of an installation. 
 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
 
3.2.Empirical Test: Hypothesis H2a and H2b 
To estimate the effects of the GHG emission disclosure mandate on the subsequent financ ia l 
operating performance of the treated firms, we separately gauge the impact on production costs 
and sales. Specifically, we test the impact on each variable through a regression approach that 
parallels equation (1) in connection with H1.   
 
                                                 
31 Because we are using installation fixed effects, we do not include a binary variable indicating treatment group 
installations for all tests.  
32 Because of the staggered implementation, we are able to estimate a model including year fixed effects as well 
as a variable indicating periods after the mandate for GHG emission disclosure (Post). 
33 As an example, the French firm Compagnie de Saint-Gobain owns installations in 15 different European 
countries. 
34 We find virtually unchanged results if we use firm fixed effects instead of installation fixed effects. We note 
that using firm fixed effects assumes similar emission levels for all installations of the same firm. However, most 
firms own several installations of different sizes, in different countries, and in different industries. Thus, we use 
installation instead of firm fixed effects for our main tests. Our results are robust to excluding industry-year or 
country-year fixed effects. 
35 Virtually identical results obtain with no outlier treatment and trimming at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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C = β0 + β1 · Post + β2 · Post · Treat + ∑ Control variables 
       + Fixed effects for installation, year, industry-year, and country-year + ε,                     (2) 
 
where all variables are defined in Table 1. As before, we employ a staggered difference- in-
differences approach with the same regressors as in equation (1). Our dependent variable in 
equation (2) is the natural logarithm of COGS for the respective firms. 
To test the impact of the disclosure mandate on sales, according to H2, we conduct the 
following regression: 
 
S = γ0 + γ1 · Post + γ 2 · Post · Treat + ∑ Control variables 
       + Fixed effects for installation, year, industry-year, and country-year + ε.                     (3) 
 
Here, S represents the natural logarithm of sales. As before, we employ a staggered difference-
in-differences approach. We estimate our regressions for H2a and H2b only at the firm level, 
reflecting that costs and sales data is not available at the installation level data. Post and Treat 
are defined as before. The variable of interest is Post · Treat. Similar to H1, we expect a positive 
coefficient on Post · Treat, i.e., β2 and γ2, which would indicate higher COGS (sales) subsequent 
to the UK Companies Act. All control variables and fixed effect variables are as explained 
above.  
 
3.3.Additional Interaction Effects 
In additional tests, we examine variations in observed emissions, costs, and sales effects for 
different sub-samples of firms. Specifically, we compare firms with high versus low emission 
levels prior to treatment. We also compare firms with high versus low analyst coverage prior to 
treatment. The benchmarks for these sample splits are the emission levels and analyst coverage 
prior to treatment in order to avoid any effect of the treatment on the sub-sample composition.  
For the subsample of relatively large emitters, we again introduce an indicator variable. It 
takes the value of one if a firm’s emission level during the pre-treatment periods is bigger or 
equal to the sample median, and zero otherwise. For the subsample of high versus low analyst 
coverage, we use a binary variable indicating high analyst coverage. This variable takes the 
value of one if a firms’ analyst coverage during the pre-treatment period is larger than or equal 
to the sample median, and zero otherwise. Analyst coverage is taken from I/B/E/S, where we 
impute a value of zero if analyst coverage is missing. 
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To examine cross-sectional variation in the treatment effect, we use our prior regression 
model with an additional interaction term Treat · Post · {High Emitter, High Coverage}. 
 
3.4.Data 
Our calculations are based on the verified emission data of the EU ETS, which covers 
individual installations, but not the firms owning the installations. Thus, our sample selection 
proceeds at the installation level before we aggregate data at the firm level. Figure 1 illustra tes 
the assignment of installations to firms. Our starting sample comprises all European (EU27 plus 
Norway) installations with emissions for the period 2009-2017 (14,000 installations).  
We first exclude installations when we could not determine the ultimate corporation owning 
the installation. This step is required, as the assignment to either the treatment or control group 
as well as pre- and post-treatment periods depend on a firm being subject to the mandate. The 
link between the installation and the ultimate corporate owner is established by the Ownership 
Links and Enhanced EUTL Dataset Project (OLP).36 The OLP provides the name and Bureau-
van-Dijk identification number (BvD-ID) of an installation’s parent company. Fiscal year ends 
are taken from BvD Orbis database. This step leads to a sample of 6,326 installations owned by 
1,993 unique firms.  
Next, we limit our sample to installations owned by firms from EU15 countries. The EU 
ETS comprises all stationary installations in all European countries. Because firms from non-
EU countries like the US or Japan operate installations in Europe too, the inclusion of these 
installations might lead to biased estimates of firms’ overall emission levels. While European 
firms operate most of their installations in other EU countries, non-European firms also tend to 
operate most of their installations in non-European countries. As we only observe emissions of 
European installations, we focus on European firms for all tests. This step results in a sample 
of 5,195 installations owned by 1,485 unique firms. 
We also limit the sample to listed firms because of the scope of the UK Companies Act. In 
addition, disclosure and emission reduction incentives of listed and unlisted firm difficult to 
compare. By restricting attention to listed and, thus, larger firms for our control, we ensure the 
comparability of firms in the sample. This step leads to a sample of 2,274 installations owned 
by 197 unique firms. 
We further exclude firms from countries with other confounding regulations. During our 
sample period, only Ireland implemented an emission-related regulation (InsideIreland. ie 
                                                 
36 Data and a technical note describing the mapping from installations to ultimate owners is available at 
http://fsr.eui.eu/climate/ownership-links-enhanced-eutl-dataset-project/.  
18 
 
2009). Next, we exclude installations if the owning firm changed during the sample period 
because, otherwise, the assignment of the treatment group might be biased. These two 
restrictions lead to a sample of 2,212 installations owned by 193 unique firms. 
Our sample also excludes installations from the energy sector based on the NACE Rev.2 
sector code “35”. This exclusion reflects that for this sector the UK government implemented 
an additional policy to support the EU ETS allowance price in 2013 (so-called Carbon Price 
Floor (CPF)). The CPF applies to electricity producers (Hirst 2018) and provides an additiona l 
emission charge beyond the EU ETS. Thus, the inclusion of these installations would likely 
lead to overstated results. 
Next, we exclude installations in case of maintenance or shut down because these emission 
reductions are likely unrelated to the mandate to disclose GHG emissions.37 In detail, we 
exclude installations if their minimum emission level over the sample period is less than 1% of 
their maximal emission level.38 This step leads to a sample of 1,101 installations owned by 166 
unique firms. 
Finally, we exclude installations with missing emission data over the sample period. We use 
a balanced sample approach to avoid measurement error of our difference-in-differences and 
fixed effects design. This step leads to a sample of 769 installations owned by 139 unique firms. 
Finally, we exclude observations in case of missing data for firm-level dependent and control 
variables. This step leads to a sample of 676 installations owned by 126 unique firms.39 
Overall, we arrive at a balanced sample of 6,066 installation-years (676 unique installations) 
and 1,134 firm-year (126 unique firms for the period 2009-2017. Table 2 delineates the sample 
selection and Table 3 presents the sample composition by country. An average sample firm 
operates 5.32 unique installations. In our final sample, 22 firms belong to the treatment group 
and 104 firms to the control group. Regarding the geographic distributions, all our treatment 
group firms are incorporated in the UK whereas most of our control group firms are 
incorporated in France (24 firms), Germany (21 firms), Spain (15 firms), and Sweden (13 
firms). 
--- Insert Table 2 here --- 
--- Insert Table 3 here --- 
 
                                                 
37 As an example Lynemouth Power Station reported 2,717,964 tCO2eq in 2014, 1,287,305 tCO2eq in 2015, and 
1,059 tCO2eq in 2016. 
38 We find virtually unchanged results if we use a lower threshold (0.5%) or a higher threshold (5%). 
39 Allowing for an unbalanced sample would again not result in a tangible change of our findings. 
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Table 4 reports descriptive statistics (Panel A) and correlations (Panel B) for our final 
sample. The average treatment (control) group firm in our sample produces yearly emissions of 
827,069 (1,213,081) tCO2eq. With respect to our outcome variables, we observe that treated 
firms emit less CO2 on average, have a lower emission intensity, a higher cost of goods sold 
and lower sales, as well as a higher gross margin than control firms. Due to a skewed 
distribution, we use log-transformed emissions, emission intensity, sales and cost in our 
regression analysis. With regard to characteristics of firms, we find that firms in the treatment 
group are larger, more highly leveraged, and have a higher share of fixed to total assets 
compared to control group firms. With regard to the Pearson and Spearman correlations, we do 
not observe high correlations between the continuous control variables. 
 
--- Insert Table 4 here --- 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Impact of the 2013 Act on GHG emissions and emission intensity 
Table 5 reports our findings regarding the impact of the GHG disclosure mandate on 
subsequent GHG emissions at the installation- and firm level. We also test the impact of the 
mandate on the variable carbon intensity, defined as the ratio of emissions to COGS. By taking 
logarithms, we can interpret a transformed value of the corresponding coefficients as additive 
percentage changes.  
Columns (I) and (II) in Table 5 present results of our estimations using installation-leve l 
emission data. The estimations at the installation level provide results using the most 
disaggregated data possible. While our main interest is at the firm level, the installation-leve l 
estimates establish a baseline reading that allows us to assess possible effects of aggregating 
installation- level data at the firm level. Columns I and II present the findings without and with 
firm-level control variables, respectively. In all specifications, we use installation, year, 
industry-year, and country-year fixed effects, to account for unobserved heterogeneity. 
In column (I) of Table 5 the estimate of the coefficient related to the policy variable Post · 
Treatment is significantly negative (p: <0.05). In economic terms, the point estimate suggests 
that, during the years after the implementation of the Act, affected firms on average decreased 
their GHG emissions by about 14% compared to companies not affected by the Act, because 
1 - exp(-0.155) = 0.14. Controlling for differences in firm characteristics (column (II)) 
essentially does not alter our main result as we obtain an estimate of -0.158, corresponding to 
20 
 
an average emissions decrease of 15%. We note that the high adjusted R2 is due to the stringent 
fixed effects specification that absorbs installation-specific and year-specific unobservable 
heterogeneity, as well as industry trends and country trends.40 The installation- level results 
support H1, i.e., the Act causes an emission reduction among treated installations, compared to 
installations owned by firms in the control group. 
Columns (III) and (IV) in Table 5 present results analogous to columns (I) and (II) at the 
firm level after aggregating the emissions of installations at the level of the ultimate entities 
owning the installation. These and all remaining firm-level regressions control for unobserved 
heterogeneity by including year and owner-specific fixed effects. Column (III) reports the 
estimates without further firm-level controls. We again find a negative and significant 
coefficient estimate on Post · Treatment (p: <0.01) indicating a reduction in GHG emissions for 
treated firms by about 18%. This reduction is comparable to the emission reduction of about 
15% measured using installation-level emission data (column (I)), suggesting that the reduction 
in emissions occurs fairly evenly across installations owned by each firm. In the richer 
specification including further covariates (column IV), we control for the same firm-leve l 
covariates as in column (II). Column (IV) corroborates the magnitude of the emission reduction 
obtained in the simpler model, again with an estimated effect of the Act on treated firms of 
about 18% (p: <0.01) when controlling for firm size, the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, and 
leverage. The analysis of firm level emissions thus also supports hypothesis H1.  
In the final set of regressions shown in Table 5, we estimate the effect of the Act on firm-
level carbon intensity. This dependent variable, defined as emissions divided by COGS, ensures 
that any observed emission reductions are not a merely a consequence of reductions in 
production volume. Column (V) reports the estimates without further firm-level controls, while 
column (VI) shows the results when including covariates. The findings obtained here are very 
similar for both specifications, with an estimated reduction in carbon intensity of about 26% (p: 
<0.01). This shows that the emission reduction is not mainly driven by a decline in output or 
capacity utilization.  
 
--- Insert Table 5 here --- 
 
                                                 
40 Controlling for installation and year fixed effects, which would make the fixed effects structure analogous to the 
firm-level regressions, affects the results only insignificantly. In this case we obtain coefficient estimates of -0.165 
and -0.171, respectively.  
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4.1.1. Assessing the validity of the common trend assumption 
The main assumption underlying the difference- in-differences approach is a common trend 
between treatment and control group firms (Roberts and Whited 2013). To examine whether a 
common pre-treatment trend exists, we follow the literature (Serfling 2016; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2003). Specifically, we replace the interaction terms Post · Treatment with 
separate interaction terms for each period relative to the implementation of the GHG mandate 
in 2013. We adjust time periods to reflect the staggered nature of the treatment. When 
estimating the model, insignificant pre-treatment coefficients close to zero indicate the valid ity 
of a common pre-treatment trend.  
In our tests of parallel trends we focus on firm-level emissions (Figure 2) and emission-
intensity (Figure 3).41 Values on the y-axis show point estimates and 90 percent confidence 
intervals. Values on the x-axis refer to the number of years removed from the start of the post-
treatment period. The benchmark period is t = -1, i.e., the last pre-treatment year. Due to the 
staggered nature of the treatment for many installations t = -1 is 2012, while for some it is 2013. 
The pre-treatment period consists of the periods t <= -4 to t = -1, while periods t = 0 to t >= 4 
constitute the post-treatment period. We aggregate the coefficients for the first and last periods 
depicted, also due to the staggered treatment. Accordingly, the t <= -4 value represents the 
average of the coefficient estimates for the interactions between each Treat variable and year 
dummies for periods four or more years prior to treatment. Analogously, the t >= 4 value is the 
average of the estimates for the interactions between Treat and year dummies for periods four 
or more years after treatment.  
Regarding firm-level emissions, we observe a clear difference in pre-treatment and post-
treatment coefficients. While treated firms have somewhat higher pre-treatment emissions than 
the control group four years prior the mandate, this difference is fairly stable during the three-
year pre-treatment period and very close to zero. Point estimates are not significantly different 
from zero in any year from t > -4 to t = -1. Based on these results, we do not find any violat ion 
of the common trends assumption for firm level emissions. The estimates for the period t = 0 
to t >= 4 show the evolution of the treatment effect over time. We observe that emissions in the 
treatment group decrease significantly immediately after the start of the post-treatment period. 
Moreover, firms reduce their emissions in every post-treatment year, except for an insignificant 
reduction in the final post-treatment. This suggests that the effect of the Act on emissions is 
permanent rather than transitory.  
                                                 
41 The parallel trends assumption also holds for installation-level emissions.  
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--- Insert Figure 2 here --- 
 
A similar picture emerges when we test for parallel common trends with regard to carbon 
intensity. None of the estimates of the pre-treatment coefficients are statistically different from 
zero, thus supporting the common trend assumption. Again, we observe a clear treatment effect, 
which manifests itself at the beginning of the post-treatment period. Post-treatment coefficients 
are negative and significant, indicating that the Act led to a permanent rather than transitory 
decline in emission intensity. 
--- Insert Figure 3 here --- 
 
4.1.2. Effects for large emitters and firms with high analyst coverage 
This subsection explores differential effects on emissions and carbon intensity for firms likely 
to face stronger visibility and stakeholder pressure. Specifically, we examine whether large 
emitters and firms facing more intense analyst coverage feel stronger pressure to pursue 
emission reductions. Large emitters are defined as those firms that had above-median emissions 
during the pre-treatment period. To identify firms with intense analyst coverage, we collect data 
on the number of earnings forecasts available for each firm. A firm is then said to have high 
analyst coverage if its number of earnings forecasts available during the pre-treatment period 
is above the median. We introduce an additional interaction term into the regression analysis to 
capture the effect of each differentiating variable: Post · Treatment · Large Emitter for large 
emitters, and Post · Treatment · High Analyst for firms subject to high analyst coverage. Table 
6 reports the results of this analysis. Columns (I)-(IV) of Table 6 contain the results for large 
emitters, while columns (V)-(VIII) present the results of the analogous regressions for firms 
exposed to relatively many analysts.  
We find that large emitters reduce their emissions significantly more than the average firm 
(p: <0.01), with an estimated additional reduction of approximately 6.5% in the specifica t ion 
including firm-level covariates (column (II)), compared to the average treatment effect of the 
Act. In contrast, we find that the carbon intensity of large emitters declined by approximate ly 
6% (p: <0.01) less than the average (column (IV)). The dampened effect on carbon intens ity 
for large emitters may reflect that their cost of goods sold decreased or increased less as 
compared to the average (see also our results H2). Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that 
large emitters had additional abatement potential which may have been realized at a relative ly 
low cost.  
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Somewhat different findings emerge for firms exposed to high analyst coverage. These 
firms also achieved an additional emission reduction of about 2.5% (p: <0.01) in excess of the 
emission reduction of the average firm, lending support to the idea that higher visibility increase 
abatement efforts. Considering the carbon intensity of firms with high analyst coverage, our 
estimates show that emission intensity decreased by an additional 4.7% (p: <0.01), as shown 
on column (VIII) of Table 6. Thus, when compared to the average, firms with high analyst 
coverage did achieve relatively larger improvements in carbon intensity after the regulat ion 
went into effect. Taken together, our findings suggest that firms with higher stakeholder 
pressure (due to high initial emissions) and firms with greater visibility both responded more 
actively to the reporting regulation. 
 
--- Insert Table 6 here --- 
 
4.2. Effects on financial operating performance 
Our next set of tests addresses the effects of the mandate on the financial operating 
performance of the disclosing firms. As argued above, firms will face cost-benefit tradeoffs in 
reducing their carbon footprint. To explore this trade-off, we separately estimate the effects of 
the mandate on production costs (measured as COGS) and sales. As before, we introduce fixed 
effects indicator variables for installations, year, industry-year, and country-year in all 
specifications in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
4.2.1. Effects on production costs 
To estimate the changes in production costs, we rerun our difference- in-differences 
estimation and use the logarithm of costs of goods sold as the dependent variable. Column (I) 
in Table 7 shows that firms subject to the mandate incur, on average, a statistically significant 
increase in production costs of about 8% (p: <0.05). This finding is robust in magnitude and 
significance also after controlling for a range of firm characteristics in column (II) of Table 7. 
Overall, these results lend support to hypothesis H2a that the reduction in emissions by the 
disclosing firms was accompanied by higher production costs.  
Increases in production costs required to achieve emission reductions may depend on 
whether firms have low or high emission levels prior to the disclosure mandate. We investigate 
potential heterogeneity in cost reductions further below and first present our findings on 
hypothesis H2b on sales effects. 
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--- Insert Table 7 here --- 
 
4.2.2. The effects on sales 
To test hypothesis H2b, we examine the implications of the reporting mandate on the sales 
of disclosing firms. Table 7 presents the results. The average effect is positive and significant, 
indicating an increase in sales of about 7% (p: <0.05), as shown in column (III). When adding 
firm controls in column (IV), the magnitude of this effect remains robust with an estimated 
sales increase of about 6% (p: <0.05), again supporting H2b. While we lack data to introduce 
an instrument for the underlying mechanism, e.g., by controlling for a firm’s pricing power, the 
estimates in Table 7 show that emission reductions are accompanied by an increase in gross 
revenue that is directly comparable in magnitude to our estimate of the incremental production 
costs. To further illustrate this point, our estimates for the respective increases in COGS and 
sales indicate the following: On average, if a firm in the treatment group earned a sales revenue 
that entailed a markup of at least 1.7% on its COGS prior to the mandate, then its operating 
profits would increase during the post mandate years, assuming all SG&A expenses remain 
unchanged42.  
We also explore the net effects on financial operating performance by looking at gross 
margins. Accordingly, we compute the gross margin percentage as (Sales - Costs of Goods 
Sold)/Sales. Columns (V) and (VI) of Table 7 yield a small negative, yet statistica l ly 
insignificant, point estimate. Thus, the gross margins of disclosing firms following the 2013 
mandate is not statistically different from the margins of our control group of non-disclos ing 
firms. This result holds with and without controlling for firm characteristics.  
Taken together, our results in this subsection show that disclosing firms on average 
experience both significant cost and sales increases, which roughly cancel each other in their 
net effect on gross margins. As such, our findings provide no evidence that the mandate to 
disclose greenhouse gas emissions had, on average, a deteriorating effect on the financ ia l 
operating performance of the treatment group. 
 
5.  SENSITIVITY AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 As a first sensitivity test, we construct a matched sample of treatment and control firms. 
Accordingly, we match each treatment firm with a control group firm within the same Fama 
                                                 
42 The 1.7% benchmark is obtained as the ratio exp(0.079)/exp(0.062), referring back to the DiD coefficients in 
Table 7. 
25 
 
and French 5 industry based on pre-treatment emission levels, i.e. 1-to-1 matching without 
replacement. We use the same dependent variables as in our prior tests. Table 8 presents the 
results and shows that our estimates are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained before. 
We acknowledge that during our sample period France mandated broad corporate 
disclosures regarding environmental stewardship. While we kept French installations for our 
main tests, we find virtually unchanged results for emission reductions if we exclude 
installations owned by French firms. Our results are also robust to not excluding energy sector 
installations or only excluding electricity installations from our sample, which, as discussed in 
our data section, have been subject to additional climate regulations during our observation 
period. 
We also explore potential heterogeneity in our estimated effects for COGS, sales, and gross 
margins. In view of our findings that larger emitters tend to achieve greater abatements, it seems 
plausible that firms with large emissions prior the mandate also achieve emission reductions at 
relatively low cost.  
To identify the cost effects for relatively large emitters (identified by emission levels before 
the mandate), we interact the treatment effect with our indicator variable for large emitters 
(Untabulated). The point estimate for this interaction is negative and significant (p: <0.01), 
suggesting that large emitters reduce emissions at significantly lower costs. We also interacted 
the treatment effect on COGS with our indicator for low/high analyst coverage, but did not 
identify any incremental effects on production costs for firms with intense analyst coverage. 
Somewhat surprising, large emitters also exhibit no significant effects with regard to their 
gross margin, despite their ability to achieve emission reductions at lower cost. We attribute 
this finding to large emitters also facing a less pronounced effect on their sales and therefore 
their gross margins remain unchanged on average. The missing sales effect of large emitters 
may be linked to their lower incremental abatement costs that would need to be passed on. Also, 
large emitters tend to operate in industries with a relatively high exposure to global trade. Firms 
with more global operations are likely to experience an attenuated effect related to their public 
image in response to a national disclosure regulation such as the UK mandate.  
 
--- Insert Table 8 here --- 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In the current debate about alternative remedies for the impending climate crisis, economists 
generally point to pricing carbon emissions or subsidizing low-carbon energy systems. This 
paper examines whether the mere requirement to disclose carbon emissions in annual reports 
will induce manufacturing firms to lower their corporate emissions over time. Our basic 
hypothesis is that, even without any regulatory obligation to improve emissions, a formal and 
structured CO2 reporting requirement will have a “pillory effect” because a firm’s stakeholders 
regard the firm’s emissions to be a negative attribute. 
Our study applies a difference- in-differences design to a set of European installations and 
exploits the introduction of the 2013 UK Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ 
Report) as a source of exogenous variation in the disclosure regime. We find that installat ions 
of UK companies subject to the reporting regulation exhibit significant reductions in GHG 
emissions compared to control installations, after controlling for various time-variant and time-
invariant fixed effects as well as firm specific variables. We find that, on average, firms reduce 
emission between 14 and 18% over three post-treatment years, relative to pre-treatment 
emission levels. These results are obtained at the installation level and at the firm level. In 
additional tests, we observe that the emission reductions are permanent rather than transitory 
and are more pronounced for larger emitters with larger savings potential. Also, firms subject 
to high analyst coverage achieve above-average emission reductions.  
With regard to financial outcomes, we document that emission reductions come at a 
significant increase in production costs, as measured by the firms’ COGS. Firms incurred that 
cost voluntarily, yet they also attained an almost compensating increase in sales, possibly 
reflecting an improved standing with customers due to their efforts in connection with a central 
CSR variable. Taken together, we obtain no evidence that the disclosure mandate had a 
deteriorating effect on the gross margins of the firms that were subject to the reporting 
regulation. 
The emissions data for the firms in our treatment group had already been publicly availab le 
prior to the UK mandate, albeit in distributed and fragmented form so that outside observers 
had to incur material search costs in order to assign installation- level emissions to publicly 
listed firms. Our analysis indicates that the disclosure requirement made firm-specific carbon 
footprint information more accessible to stakeholders and thereby resulted in real emissio n 
reduction effects. In conclusion, the increased transparency associated with the reporting 
mandate in the UK appears to have been a meaningful policy tool in reducing carbon emissions.  
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Figure 1: Mapping of installations to firms 
 
Notes: This figure shows the mapping of data at the installation level as reported in the EU ETS 
to treatment and control group firms. Using information on the owner of each installation, we 
map one installation to either a treatment or a control group firm. The link between the 
installation owner and the ultimate owner (i.e., firm in our sample) is established by the 
Ownership Links and Enhanced EUTL Dataset Project (OLP), which provides the name and 
Bureau-van-Dijk identification number of an installation’s parent company.  
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Figure 2: Change in emissions surrounding the disclosure mandate 
 
Notes: This figure shows the change in verified emissions surrounding the mandate to disclose 
GHG information. Values on the y-axis show differences in the natural logarithm of emissions 
of treated and control group firms and 90 percent confidence intervals. To obtain these 
estimates, we replicate model (1) but replace Post · Treatment with separate interaction terms 
for each individual year surrounding the mandate. To account for the staggered implementa t ion 
of the Act, we adjust time periods using relative time periods. Values on the x-axis indicate 
periods relative to the first-time application of the Act (t = 0). For firms with fiscal year end 
after September 30th 2013, t = 0 refers to the year 2013. For firms with fiscal year end before 
September 30th 2013, t = 0 refers to the year 2014. Periods t = -2, t = -3, and t <= -4 indicate 
periods prior to the first-time application of the Act. Periods t = 0, t = +1, and t > =2 indicate 
periods on or after the first-time application of the Act. We use the last year prior to the first-
time application (t = -1) as the benchmark period.  
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Figure 3: Change in carbon intensity surrounding the disclosure mandate 
 
Notes: This figure shows the change in carbon intensity surrounding the mandate to disclose 
GHG information. Values on the y-axis show differences in the natural logarithm of emissions 
of treated and control group firms and 90 percent confidence intervals. To obtain these 
estimates, we replicate model (1) but replace Post · Treatment with separate interaction terms 
for each individual year surrounding the mandate. To account for the staggered implementa t ion 
of the Act, we adjust time periods using relative time periods. Values on the x-axis indicate 
periods relative to the first-time application of the Act (t = 0). For firms with fiscal year end 
after September 30th 2013, t = 0 refers to the year 2013. For firms with fiscal year end before 
September 30th 2013, t = 0 refers to the year 2014. Periods t = -2, t = -3, and t <= -4 indicate 
periods prior to the first-time application of the Act. Periods t = 0, t= +1, and t > = 2 indicate 
periods on or after the first-time application of the Act. We use the last year prior to the first-
time application (t = -1) as the benchmark period.  
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition Data 
Source 
      
Dependent variables     
ln(Emissions) Natural logarithm of yearly verified emissions in 
metric tons of CO2eq. 
EU ETS 
ln(COGS) Natural logarithm of COGS. BvD Orbis 
ln(Sales) Natural logarithm of sales. BvD Orbis 
ln(CI) Natural logarithm of verified emissions scaled by 
COGS (in ‘000 USD). 
EU ETS, 
BvD Orbis 
Gross Margin Sales minus COGS scaled by sales. BvD Orbis 
   
Moderator variables   
High Emitter  Indicator variable, 1: a firms’ emission level during 
the pre-treatment periods is above or equal to the 
sample median, 0: otherwise. 
EU ETS 
High Coverage Indicator variable, 1: a firms’ analyst coverage during 
the pre-treatment periods is above or equal to the 
sample median, 0: otherwise. 
I/B/E/S 
   
Experimental 
variables 
    
Post Indicator variable, 1: financial years ending on or after 
the 30th of September 2013, 0: otherwise. 
EU ETS 
Treatment Indicator variable, 1: UK listed and incorporated firm 
affected by the mandate for GHG emission disclosure. 
I.e., UK-incorporated company whose equity capital is 
either listed on the Main Market of the London Stock 
Exchange, an exchange in a European Economic Area 
state, the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq, 0: 
otherwise. 
EU ETS 
      
Control variables     
Size Natural logarithm of a firms’ market value. Market 
value is defined as enterprise value minus long-term 
debt + cash – loans.  
BvD 
Amadeus 
Leverage Long term liabilities plus short-term liabilities divided 
by total assets. 
BvD 
Amadeus 
Asset Intensity Fixed assets scaled by total assets BvD Orbis 
Notes: This table defines all variables used in this study. 
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Table 2: Sample selection  
 
          
  Installation level Firm level 
Initial sample: Exclusion Installation-years Unique Installations 
Unique 
firms 
All stationary installations listed in the EU ETS with non-  
missing emission data for the period 2009-2017 
  98,836 14,000   
          
Exclusion of…         
… installations without known ultimate owner  
and date of fiscal year end 
-52,868 45,968 6,326 1,993 
… installations owned by non-EU firms -8,104 37,864 5,195 1,485 
… installations owned by unlisted firms -20,752 17,112 2,274 197 
… installations affected by confounding  
regulations or ownership changes 
-320 16,792 2,212 193 
… energy sector installations -7,677 9,115 1,224 175 
… virtually closed installations (i.e.  
maintenance or temporary shutdown) 
-696 8,419 1,101 166 
… unbalanced emission data -1,498 6,921 769 139 
… missing firm-level data -855 6,066 674 126 
          
Final sample for regression analyses   6,066 674 126 
Firm-year observations for 
 the period 2009-2017 
      1,134 
          
Notes: This table describes the sample selection for estimating the influence of a GHG disclosure mandate on firms’ GHG emission levels and 
operating performance. 
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Table 3: Sample composition 
        
  Control group 
Treatment  
group Total 
Austria 45 0 45 
Belgium 54 0 54 
Germany 189 0 189 
Denmark 27 0 27 
Spain 135 0 135 
Finland 72 0 72 
France 216 0 216 
United Kingdom  0 198 198 
Luxembourg 9 0 9 
The Netherlands 45 0 45 
Portugal 27 0 27 
Sweden 117 0 117 
Total 936 198 1,134 
Notes: This table presents the geographic distribution of sample firms. Treatment group 
firms are listed and incorporated in the United Kingdom. Control group firms are listed and 
incorporated in other EU15 states. 
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Table 4: Summary statistics 
    N Mean Lower quartile Median Upper quartile Std. deviation 
Panel A: Treatment Group             
  Emissions (t CO2eq) 198 827,069 27,539 51,004 202,332 2,621,052 
  ln(CI) 198 -3.851 -5.195 -3.892 -2.728 2.071 
  COGS ('000.000 USD) 198 25,536 1,071 4,842 11,353 59,108 
  Sales ('000.000 USD) 198 38,954 1,855 15,987 34,829 72,870 
  Gross Margin 198 0.484 0.231 0.515 0.723 0.249 
  Leverage 198 0.215 0.137 0.218 0.281 0.113 
  Size 198 23.01 21.982 23.685 24.965 2.309 
  Asset Intensity 198 0.666 0.605 0.683 0.767 0.133 
                
Panel B: Control group             
  Emissions (t CO2eq) 945 1,213,081 29,078 152,327 463,316 3,326,045 
  ln(CI) 945 -3.353 -4.860 -3.246 -1.521 2.363 
  COGS ('000.000 USD) 945 15,620 1,161 4,973 14,345 28,263 
  Sales ('000.000 USD) 945 23,734 2,513 8,121 26,933 39,176 
  Gross Margin 945 0.403 0.268 0.368 0.521 0.18 
  Leverage 945 0.183 0.115 0.176 0.241 0.101 
  Size 945 22.379 21.255 22.570 23.591 1.777 
  Asset Intensity 945 0.610 0.516 0.617 0.704 0.128 
 
Panel C: Correlations                   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ln(Emissions) (1)   0.607 0.284 0.266 -0.175 0.076 0.158 0.124 
ln(CI) (2) 0.628   -0.523 -0.531 0.105 -0.056 -0.516 0.136 
ln(COGS) (3) 0.325 -0.529   0.969 -0.374 0.110 0.787 -0.049 
ln(Sales) (4) 0.308 -0.523 0.973   -0.184 0.148 0.876 0.055 
Gross Margin (5) -0.200 0.151 -0.401 -0.191   0.098 0.087 0.389 
Leverage (6) 0.046 -0.039 0.091 0.141 0.151   0.162 0.330 
Size (7) 0.193 -0.485 0.799 0.881 0.094 0.186   0.228 
Asset Intensity (8) 0.120 0.134 -0.031 0.070 0.405 0.354 0.253   
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regression separately for treatment (Panel A) and control firms (Panel 
B). In Panel A and B, values for emissions, costs, and sales are in non-log form. Panel C presents Spearman (above) and Pearson (below the diagonal) 
correlations for all variables used for empirical analyses. Bold figures in Panel C indicate statistically significant correlations that are at least at the 10 
percent level. Variable are defined in Table 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 5: The effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on emissions 
  Installation Level   Firm level 
  (I) (II)   (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Dependent variable: ln(Emissions) ln(Emissions)   ln(Emissions) ln(Emissions) ln(CI) ln(CI) 
 
Experimental variables               
Post 0.020 0.016   0.181** 0.180** 0.146* 0.131 
  (0.759) (0.797)   (0.026) (0.038) (0.090) (0.112) 
Post · Treatment -0.155** -0.157**   -0.180*** -0.182*** -0.251*** -0.253*** 
  (0.011) (0.012)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control variables               
Leverage   -0.335     -0.073   -0.534 
    (0.123)     (0.842)   (0.274) 
Size   -0.014     -0.012   -0.212*** 
    (0.674)     (0.688)   (0.004) 
Asset Intensity   0.229     0.236   0.178 
    (0.490)     (0.183)   (0.629) 
Intercept 10.528*** 10.772***   11.699*** 11.839*** -3.497*** 1.278 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.426) 
Firm fixed effects       Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Installation fixed effects Yes Yes           
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Installation sector · year fixed effects Yes Yes           
Installation country · year fixed effects Yes Yes           
Observations 6,066 6,066   1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
Adjusted R² 0.955 0.955   0.982 0.982 0.973 0.974 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating the effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on GHG emissions (equation (1)). The dependent variable 
in columns (I) to (IV) is the natural logarithm of yearly emissions in metric tons of CO2eq. The dependent variable in columns (V) and (VI) is the 
natural logarithm of yearly emissions in metric tons of CO2eq scaled by cost of goods sold, i.e. carbon intensity. Reported values are coefficients and 
p-values in parentheses. Variables are defined in Table 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. In columns (I) and (II) standard errors are clustered by the firm that owns the installation. In 
columns (III) to (VI) standard errors are clustered by country.
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Table 6: The effect of high ex-ante emissions levels and analyst coverage 
  Moderating effect of high ex-ante emission levels Moderating effect of high ex-ante analyst coverage 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV)   (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
Dependent variable: ln(Emissions) ln(Emissions) ln(CI) ln(CI)   ln(Emissions) ln(Emissions) ln(CI) ln(CI) 
 
Experimental variables                   
Post 0.179** 0.178** 0.150* 0.133   0.181** 0.180** 0.145* 0.129 
  (0.026) (0.039) (0.088) (0.112)   (0.026) (0.039) (0.091) (0.114) 
Post · Treatment -0.162*** -0.161*** -0.288*** -0.272***   -0.170*** -0.167*** -0.234*** -0.221*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post · Treatment 
· Large Emitter -0.057*** -0.065*** 0.115*** 0.060***           
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)           
Post · Treatment 
· High Coverage           -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.050*** 
            (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control variables                   
Leverage   -0.081   -0.527     -0.074   -0.537 
    (0.823)   (0.287)     (0.839)   (0.270) 
Size   -0.013   -0.211***     -0.012   -0.213*** 
    (0.668)   (0.005)     (0.685)   (0.004) 
Asset Intensity   0.240   0.175     0.240   0.186 
    (0.179)   (0.633)     (0.181)   (0.620) 
Intercept 11.700*** 11.861*** -3.499*** 1.257   11.699*** 11.841*** -3.496*** 1.282 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.437)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.424) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134   1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
Adjusted R² 0.982 0.982 0.973 0.974   0.982 0.982 0.917 0.973 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating the effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on GHG emissions. The dependent variable in columns 
(I) to (IV) is the natural logarithm of yearly emissions in metric tons of CO2eq. Reported values are coefficients and p-values in parentheses The 
dependent variable in columns (V) and (VI) is the natural logarithm of yearly emissions in metric tons of CO2eq scaled by cost of goods sold. Variables 
are defined in Table 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.1 levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Table 7: The effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on financial operating performance 
  (I) (II) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Dependent variable: ln(COGS) ln(COGS) ln(Sales) ln(Sales) Gross Margin Gross Margin 
              
Experimental variables             
Post 0.025 0.041* 0.014 0.037* 0.001 0.004 
  (0.362) (0.054) (0.584) (0.064) (0.861) (0.648) 
Post · Treatment 0.085** 0.079** 0.074** 0.062** -0.009 -0.011 
  (0.031) (0.017) (0.036) (0.010) (0.213) (0.116) 
Control variables             
Leverage   0.512*   0.733**   0.070 
    (0.079)   (0.018)   (0.250) 
Size   0.181***   0.215***   0.027** 
    (0.004)   (0.000)   (0.022) 
Asset Intensity   0.183   0.392   0.099** 
    (0.570)   (0.246)   (0.037) 
Intercept 22.118*** 17.818*** 22.741*** 17.503*** 0.417*** -0.261 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.283) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
Adjusted R² 0.982 0.983 0.987 0.99 0.913 0.917 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating the effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on operating performance (equations (2) and (3)). The 
dependent variable in Columns (I) to (II) is the natural logarithm of yearly COGS. The dependent variable in columns (III) and (IV) is the natural 
logarithm of yearly sales. The dependent variable in columns (V) and (VI) is the yearly gross margin. Reported values are coefficients and p-values 
in parentheses Variables are defined in Table 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Table 8: Results for matched sample 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (IV) 
Dependent variable: ln(Emissions) ln(CI) ln(COGS) ln(Sales) Gross Margin 
            
Experimental variables           
Post 0.266** 0.308** -0.046 -0.036 0.014 
  (0.020) (0.047) (0.550) (0.489) (0.262) 
Post · Treatment -0.206** -0.404** 0.178* 0.159** -0.017 
  (0.050) (0.016) (0.055) (0.042) (0.220) 
Control variables           
Leverage 0.221 -0.906 1.242* 1.257* 0.044 
  (0.672) (0.326) (0.051) (0.081) (0.561) 
Size 0.010 -0.271** 0.237* 0.302*** 0.046*** 
  (0.707) (0.034) (0.070) (0.007) (0.010) 
Asset Intensity 0.182 0.842** -0.397* -0.311* 0.108 
  (0.403) (0.025) (0.053) (0.065) (0.165) 
Intercept 10.553*** 1.990 16.313*** 15.547*** -0.626* 
  (0.000) (0.442) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 
Adjusted R² 0.957 0.964 0.987 0.990 0.940 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating the effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on 
GHG emissions and operating performance. We use a one-to-one matching without 
replacement on pre-treatment emissions for firms within the same Fama and French 5 industry. 
Reported values are coefficients and p-values in parentheses. Variables are defined in Table 1. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country. 
 
